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Abstract
In this work, one-round Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) is attacked with an Evolutionary Computation method
inspired by a combination of Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Harmony Search (HS). The system presented evaluates
and evolves a population of candidate keys and compares paintext-ciphertext pairs of the known key against said
population. We verify that randomly generated keys are the hardest to derive. Keys composed of words containing
all on-bits are more diﬃcult to break than keys composed of words containing all oﬀ-bits. Keys which have repeated
words are easiest to derive. Finally, the present EC strategy is capable of deriving degenerate keys; this is most evident
when keys are front loaded so that the ﬁrst byte of each word has the highest density of on-bits.
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1. Introduction
In this work, an evolutionary computation (EC) strategy which combines operators from Genetic Algorithm (GA)
and Harmony Search (HS) are used to attack Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA). The system attempts to derive a key
over one round of TEA given randomly generated known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This approach is more diﬃcult
than using chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs which are pairs selected based on known statistical vulnerabilities in a
given encryption scheme. The GA and HS are both optimization heuristics which are useful in searching the solution
space of high dimensional problems.
2. Tiny encryption algorithm
Tiny Encryption Algorithm [1] (TEA) is a simple, fast Feistel block cipher (Figure 1). A Feistel block cipher
performs encryption by operating on the bits of a plaintext message in an iterative fashion. At each iteration, the bits
are further substituted and permuted via a system of logical operators, keys and constants known as key schedulers.
TEA utilizes a 128-bit key (composed of four 32-bit words), to encrypt a message in blocks of 64-bits (each composed
of two 32-bit words). When multiple rounds of TEA are applied, the process indicated by the diagram is repeated
multiple times. The object called sum is the key scheduler and it ensures that the bits of the key that are used in
the encryption function change from round to round. Note that one round of TEA is composed of two passes of data
through the function – one pass for each half of the message text. TEA is characterized by Shepherd [2] as (1) resistant
to diﬀerential cryptanalysis due to adherence to Shannon’s diﬀusion and confusion requirement; (2) highly eﬃcient
due to its use of native software bitwise functions; and (3) TEA is capable of achieving suﬃcient dispersion after only
six iterations (although 32 iterations were originally recommended). Dispersion implies that half of the bits of the
resulting ciphertext change when any single bit is ﬂipped in the plaintext or key.
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Figure 1: A schematic of one-round TEA.
3. Evolutionary computation in cryptanalysis of TEA
Previous evolutionary computation (EC) based cryptanalysis work has been done on Feistel encryption schemes
in the past[3, 4]. We will concern ourselves with two cases of such work that are more related to the current work.
First, there is the direct attack to derive the key of plaintext-ciphertext pair. Second, there is the indirect cryptanalysis
used to determine bits of high correlation between the plaintext-key-ciphertext triplet. An example of the ﬁrst case is
an attack to derive the key of Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) performed by Brown et al. [5]. In that study,
known plaintexts were chosen in order to deduce which keys are weak against Genetic Algorithm (GA). The GA
evolved a population of keys until they were capable of reproducing the known plaintext-ciphertext pairs given the
SPN. This naturally lead to a ﬁtness evaluation that calculates the diﬀerence between the ciphertext of an evolving
key population, and the ciphertext known to be correct. An evolving key population that is capable of generating a
ciphertext closer to that which is known to be correct is more ﬁt. This acts as the direct inspiration for the present
study.
In the second case indirect attacks using evolutionary computation have been performed for bits of high correlation
in TEA. With the use of GA, Herna´ndez et al.[6] evolved bitmasks corresponding to positions in the plaintext and key
to decide which bits imparted the least entropy to the resultant ciphertext. The ﬁtness function used was a χ-square
function that describes the conﬁdence that unmasked bits were correlated with the ciphertext. This was eﬀective for
two rounds of TEA. Garrett [7] then extended that work up to four rounds of TEA. Finally, Hu [8] used quantum-
inspired genetic algorithm to perform similar cryptanalysis for TEA up to ﬁve rounds. It should be noted that the
resulting bitmasks of these studies essentially point toward weak keys given speciﬁc messages. It is the objective of
this present study to describe the strength of particular keys in one-round TEA with respect to a space of randomly
generated messages. In this case, the present work closely follows Brown’s. The ciphertext and plaintext pairs are
generated, and the ability for a guessed key to produce a ciphertext given its plaintext is proportional to the ﬁtness of
that guessed key.
4. The present evolutionary computation strategy
The general strategy of this EC will be described mainly in the perspective of GA. In GA, the search space of a
problem is represented by a population of chromosomes – each chromosome is a guess at the correct solution. The
population size is ﬁxed and operators are used to alter these chromosomes stochastically. Those chromosomes that are
better guesses as compared to the actual solution are said to be more ﬁt (in harmony search, a chromosome called a
harmony). In this study, we are directly evolving a solution key for a plaintext-ciphertext pair. As such, a guess’ ability
to produce ciphertexts that are more similar to the desired solution are more ﬁt and are retained in the population while
the others are deleted. The correctness deﬁned is the hamming distance of the guessed keys’ ciphertexts as compared
to the known and correct key’s ciphertext. This hamming distance is known as the ﬁtness function. Besides the ﬁtness
function, we borrow genetic operators from GA as follows: (1) point mutation, and (2) crossover. In point mutation,
chromosomes are subjected to randomly generated bitﬂips. In crossover, two chromosomes are selected as parents; a
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common location is chosen in both of the chromosomes for which the swapping of the ﬁrst half and last half of each
parent is performed to create two child chromosomes. We borrow HS operators as follows: (1) improvise harmony,
and (2) bitwise pitch adjustment. In improvise harmony, each byte of a new key is generated as follows. Assigned
in the location of the ﬁrst byte, the ﬁrst byte of a randomly selected key in the existing population is chosen. In the
location of the second byte, the second byte of a randomly selected key in the population is chosen. This continues
until all bytes of the new key have been assigned (note that in the originating work, this assignment was performed
based on bit-by-bit assignments rather than byte-by-byte assignments). In bitwise pitch adjustment, bytes or words are
swapped within a given parent key to create a new child key (note that in the originating work, only bits are swapped).
5. Experimental design and parameters
Two diﬀerent experiments were run which tested two diﬀerent groups of key schemes. In the ﬁrst experiment,
the three words 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF and 0xXXXXXXXXwere exhaustively assigned to each of the four possible
words in a key with thirty trials each. The word 0xXXXXXXXX is taken to mean a randomly generated word. In the
second experiment, the four words 0xFF000000, 0x00FF0000, 0x0000FF00 and 0x000000FF were exhaustively
assigned, again to each of the four words in a key with thirty trials. To clarify, this resulted in a grand total of 81
key schemes tested in the ﬁrst experiment (34) and 256 key schemes tested in the second experiment (44) where each
single scheme was tried thirty times. The population is passed through the operators of the EC strategy as shown in
the schematic Figure 2.
Figure 2: A schematic of the evolutionary computation strategy used.
A randomly generated initial key population of 70 is created (KP). This population is then used to create 70
additional keys using the point mutation operator (in buﬀer GA1). The buﬀer GA1 is then used to create 70 additional
keys using the crossover operator (in buﬀer GA2), and another 70 using improvise harmony operator (in buﬀer HS1).
The buﬀer HS1 is then used to create three more buﬀers of 70 additional keys each based on pitch-adjustments as
follows. Buﬀer HS2 is based on swapping two words within each key, HS3 is based on swapping two bytes in a single
word within each key, and HS4 is based on swapping two bytes in every single word within each key. To reduce the
number of candidate keys back to 70, the ﬁttest 10 keys in each of the buﬀers (KP, GA1, GA2, HS[1..4]) are retained
to be used as the new KP for the next generation. A population is said to have converged when its ﬁttest member is a
valid solution key given all one hundred plaintext-ciphertext message blocks.
In point mutation, the probability of ﬂipping a bit in a key was 2%. One-point cross-over was used with a uniform
distribution of selecting any index across the length of the parent keys. The harmony search operators were all applied
with uniform distribution over all of the keys (for improvise harmony) or over all of the words and bytes of each
single key (for pitch adjustment). For each trial, 100 randomly generated plaintext message blocks were encrypted to
ciphertext. The known plaintext-ciphertext pairs were then used to evolve and evaluate the ﬁtness of the population
of keys. A population of 70 keys were allowed in each generation and a total of 5000 generations of training were
allowed as a maximum per trial. When the system could not derive a key in that time, the trial is said to have not
converged.
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6. Results
The relative performance of the present EC strategy in the ﬁrst experiment is summarized in the three plots in
Figure 3.
Figure 3: The relative proportion of convergences for each key scheme (Left). The relative speed of convergence for converged trials (Centre). The
relative proportion of degenerate keys observed (Right). The radius of each dot is proportional to the value described and all values are normalized
to the best value achieved. A cross indicates that a value is missing because no convergences took place. These plots characterize the relative
behaviours of keys constructed from (0) set to words that are only oﬀ-bits, (F) set to words that are only on-bits and (X) set to words that are
pseudorandom. The 32-bit words for each key are given by K0, K1, K2, K3 from the ﬁrst to the last word respectively.
The proportion of convergences observed appears to depend on the number of 0 words, F words, and X but not
dependent on the positions where these words occur. Table 1 shows the number of convergences against the counts of
each type of word and summarizes the data in the left plot of Figure 3.
Table 1: The average count of convergences over thirty trials given the occurrences of the words (0), (F), and (X). The occurrences indicates the
number of times a word occurs in a key. Aﬀected keys indicates the number of keys which contain that number of such words. The average (x¯)
standard deviation (σ) are reported.
Word Occurrences Aﬀected keys x¯ / 30 σ
0
1 32 2.9 3.9
2 24 5.0 5.1
3 8 13.1 1.5
4 1 24.0 –
F
1 32 2.8 4.4
2 24 5.6 5.0
3 8 9.0 3.3
4 1 14.0 –
X
1 32 5.1 4.0
2 24 0.9 1.3
3 8 0.0 0.0
4 1 0.0 –
The highest number of convergences recorded were observed when all four words of the key were set to 0 while
no convergences were observed when three or four words of the key were X. These observations are consistent with
our expectation that higher entropy keys are harder to derive. For the keys consisting of the 0 and F, convergences
increases as we increase the number occurrences of those words. The standard deviation also drops overall but rises
when there are exactly two occurrences of 0 and F. The word 0 is easier to derive than the word F due to the addition
operator used in TEA. The plot in the centre of Figure 3 shows the relative speed of convergence; i.e. 5000 minus the
number of generations needed to converge. These values are summarized in Table 2.
The keys composed of more 0 converge fastest with greater stability (lower σ). As before, trials deriving keys
with F follows next in performance leaving F to last place due to the high entropy of those keys.
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Table 2: The generation of convergence for converged trials – the average x¯ and standard deviation σ for keys containing a variable number of
0, F and X words. Occurrences indicates the number of such words in a given key, and converged trials indicates the proportion of trials which
successfully derived such a key.
Word Occurrences Converged trials x¯ generation σ
0
1 92 / 960 2069.6 1519.1
2 121 / 720 2192.8 1399.7
3 105 / 240 1699.0 1311.8
4 24 / 30 801.0 1112.8
F
1 89 / 960 2118.6 1504.9
2 135 / 720 2220.5 1370.9
3 72 / 240 1506.2 1334.5
4 14 / 30 1216.7 1357.5
X
1 164 / 960 2241.4 1435.5
2 22 / 720 2931.8 1466.5
The right-side plot in Figure 3 shows the relative proportion of degenerate keys discovered. A degenerate key is a
key that is equivalent to the one that is used to create the ciphertext. In TEA, each key is part of a degenerate triplet.
A degenerate key is discovered when a convergence to that key occurs. Degenerate triplets share all bits with one
another with the exception that the most signiﬁcant bits in the ﬁrst two words only, or the last two words only are
ﬂipped. The greatest number of degenerate keys converged was ﬁve, found in the all-0 key. The behaviour of the EC
in the second experiment are shown in Figure 4. Here, four words were used to construct keys where each word is
composed of one byte that is all on, and all remaining bits oﬀ.
Figure 4: The relative proportion of convergences for each key scheme (Left). The relative speed of convergence for converged trials (Centre).
The relative proportion of degenerate keys observed (Right). Keys were constructed with words as follows: (0) set to 0xFF000000, (1) set to
0x00FF0000, (2) set to 0x0000FF00, and (3) set to 0x000000FF. The 32-bit words for each key are given by K0, K1, K2, K3 from the ﬁrst to the
last word respectively.
Table 3 summarizes three cases of convergence behaviour in the left plot of Figure 4.
In case 1 when (K0, K1) or (K2, K3) contain matching or mismatched words, no change in the average number of
converged trials per key scheme is experienced. In case 2, when (K0, K2) or (K1, K3) are matched or mismatched, the
number of convergences does change. Two pairs of matched words demonstrate the highest probability of convergence
while two pairs of mismatched words creates words that are diﬃcult to derive. Finally in case 3, a higher number of
matched words regardless of position produces easier keys to break. Table 4 reports the generation of convergence in
the second experiment corresponding to the centre plot of Figure 4.
The amount of time required to converge increases as there are fewer matching words within the key. Finally, in
the right plot of Figure 4, two deﬁnite stretches of degenerate keys can be seen where (K0, K1) are the same forming
a vertical line and (K2, K3) forming a horizontal line. The key composed of only the word 0xFF000000 has the the
greatest number of degenerate keys, nine.
176  Eddie Yee-Tak Ma and Charlie Obimbo / Procedia Computer Science 6 (2011) 171–176
Table 3: The proportion of convergences given three partitions of trials in the second experiment of this work. The ﬁrst case splits apart trials based
on matches and mismatches of (K0, K1) and (K2, K3). The second case splits trials based on matches of (K0, K2) and (K1, K3). The third case
organizes cases based on the total number of matched words regardless of position. The aﬀected keys indicates the number of key schemes which
ﬁt the constraints of the matching words. Each of the aﬀected key schemes has 30 trials. The average x¯ and standard deviation σ given those thirty
trials over all aﬀected keys is shown.
Arrangement of matching words Aﬀected keys x¯ / 30 σ
K0 = K1 ∧ K2 = K3 16 7.0 4.4
K0 = K1 ∧ K2  K3 48 6.9 3.7
K0  K1 ∧ K2 = K3 48 6.9 4.1
K0  K1 ∧ K2  K3 144 7.0 3.2
K0 = K2 ∧ K1 = K3 16 10.8 2.8
K0 = K2 ∧ K1  K3 48 8.3 2.8
K0  K2 ∧ K1 = K3 48 8.3 3.6
K0  K2 ∧ K1  K3 144 5.7 3.2
exactly four matching words 4 13.0 3.4
exactly three matching words 48 9.8 3.2
exactly two matching words 180 6.5 3.1
no matching words 24 3.5 1.7
Table 4: The generation of convergence for converged trials given the number of matched words. Presented are the average generation x¯ and
standard deviation σ.
Word Converged trials x¯ generation σ
exactly four matching words 52 / 120 1779.7 1352.0
exactly three matching words 471 / 1440 2196.9 1348.2
exactly two matching words 1175 / 5400 2408.9 1291.0
no matching words 85 / 720 2776.8 1207.8
7. Conclusion
From the ﬁrst experiment, keys that were composed of more random words were more resilient to the EC attack.
Keys composed of all-on-bit words are more resilient to keys with all-oﬀ-bit words. Convergence rate is similarly
aﬀected, where the most random words are the most diﬃcult to derive. This EC method was capable of deriving
degenerate keys since the ﬁtness function was based only on the ability of the key to encipher a message the same way
as TEA given the same key. In the second experiment, the diﬃculty of breaking keys was determined by matching
(easier) or mismatching (more diﬃcult) words in (K0, K2) and (K1, K3). More matching words are easier to break
with this EC than fewer matching words. This behaviour is likely due to the word swapping behaviour of the pitch
adjustment operator borrowed from harmony search. Degenerate keys are easiest to derive for key schemes which
incorporate all on-bits in the ﬁrst byte (0xFF000000) for words in (K0, K1) and (K2, K3).
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